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Testimony Before the Subcommittee 
of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
Paul Ramsey, Ph.D., Litt. D. 
This testimony was originally 
published in the May 81, 1974 
issue of COMMONWEAL under 
the title " Protecting the Unborn." 
Reprinted with permission from 
COMMONWEAL, 232 Madison 
Avenue, New York , N. Y. 10016. 
Dr. Ramsey is Harrington 
Spear Paine Professor of Religion 
at Princeton University. A schol-
ar and teacher in the fields of 
religious ethics and social phi-
losophy, he is also concerned with 
the serious moral issues emerging 
in the area of medical ethics. 
I am here as a private individ-
ual who on January 22,1973, was 
robbed of his right as a citizen to 
participate in the public processes 
by which we as a people deter-
mine the outer limits of the hu-
man community - the limit at 
the first of life and soon it may 
also be t he limit at the end of life 
- within which boundaries an 
equal justice and equal protecta-
bility should prevail for all who 
bear the agreed "signs of life." 
These are judgments about the 
best factual evidence. Physicians 
are our deputies in applying the 
criteria for stating that a man has 
died ; but they alone do not set 
the criteria. In the unlikely event 
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that physicians began to allow 
people to die all the way through 
to the end of cellular life (until 
hair and nails stopped growing) 
we would find ways of telling 
them that that is not what we 
mean by the difference between a 
still living human being and a 
corpse. I hope we would do the 
same in the (more likely) event 
that physicians began to declare 
people dead not on the basis of 
brain-stem death (the current 
"up-dating"), but when there is 
only cessation or destruction of 
the higher cortical functions of 
the brain (thus certifying as 
corpses for burial or for organ do-
nation bodies whose hearts still 
are beating spontaneously and 
naturally without any external 
support-systems) . 
So we have legislation or case-
law based on it, wise or unwise, 
traditional or novel, defining 
death. This legitimates or depu-
tizes physician declarations of 
death. Professor Alexander M. 
Capron of the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School has re-
cently summarized the need for 
and the propriety of a societal 
function in regard to new pro-
posals for updating the criteria 
for death which physicians apply.l 
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Now suppose the Supreme 
Court were to rule that determin-
ing the outer limit of the human 
community short of which there 
exists a right to life still resident 
in the dying is a matter falling 
strictly within the privacy of the 
doctor-patient relation, or is even 
to be decided by physician and 
family members. On this supposi-
tion the state legislatures could 
limit what physicians do in mak-
ing life and death decisions only 
by licensure. Would that Court 
decision not be deemed an ex-
ercise of "raw judicial power?" 
Would there not be need for a 
constitutional amendment to re-
store the setting of criteria to our 
public and legislative processes? 
The deputyship of physicians or 
of any single individual or group 
of individuals does not extend to 
fixing the criteria for determining 
who shall or shall not be deemed 
a subject of rights. That surely 
is the people's business. While 
saying it did not settle that is-
sue, the Supreme Court did just 
that - all the while proclaiming 
that when individual human life 
begins is a murky theological 
question. For all practical pur-
poses the Court pronounced that 
no one enters the human com-
munity nor has any rights due 
him until viability. Questionable 
as that may be, it at least has the 
virtue of being based on an im-
plicit claim to possess the best 
factual evidence in the light of 
modern knowledge. But behind 
that is, for me, the monstrous 
claim that the Court decides such 
matters. 
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To restore to political and leg-
islative decision-making processes 
the power to draw an agreed limit 
as to the first entrance of a hu-
man being into the human com-
munity is, of course, to load us 
the people again with a fearsome 
responsibility. I see no escaping 
that, since I know of no revelation 
of such factual judgments. The 
only thing more fearful would, 
however, be for such verdicts to 
be placed in the hands of private 
individuals, or to be determined 
by a 7-2 decision of the Court. 
Such have always been among 
the human, all too human deci-
sions silently taken by mankind 
in the course of our torturous his-
tory. Christian teachings about 
abortion, for example, have varied 
over the centuries. But these have 
varied according to changing 
judgments about the evidence for 
believing there is a new life on the 
human scene. Fancies about 40 
and 80 days of gestational life, re-
liance on quickening, etc. have 
been grounds in times past for 
drawing the line between unpro-
tectable and protectable human 
life. Only in the nineteenth cen-
tury after the discovery of the 
ovum did there come to be a 
credible rational basis for either 
Catholics or the A. M. A. (see q. 
in Wade) to believe that life be-
gins with conception. 
The Worth of Human Life 
What has generally been in-
variant in Western civilization has 
been the rights and dignity and 
protection to be accorded to the 
individual life deemed to be hu-
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man. Our religious faiths, our 
philosophies of life, our human-
istic visions have to do with justi-
fying and upholding the worth we 
recognize in or impute to human 
life. "Subsuming cases" under the 
value of life - to say, This is a 
human life that has now put in 
his claim upon the human com-
munity to be accorded equal jus-
tice and protection - that is a 
different sort of judgment, and 
one to be made with fear and 
trembling. Yet we collectively 
must decide such matters, and 
shall continue to do so as long as 
we have the courage to accept the 
necessity for together setting the 
criteria for finding a life to be 
human life at either end of the 
scale. It is only the pretense that 
we can remain civilized after such 
decisions are left up to the va-
garies of private judgment that 
has to be denied. 
I candidly state to you that I 
am not very hopeful over what 
people generally through their 
representatives will decide about 
these life and death issues - in 
a technologically medical era 
when "quality of life" is judged 
to override being alive, and 
"Choose" has replaced "Choose 
life" as our moral maxim. 
Some comfort may be taken 
from the fact that over ten years 
ago the demographer Judith 
Blake took a look at the anti-
permissive abortion sentiment in 
this country and advised that the 
only way to accomplish an ar-
bitrary liberty to choose between 
one life and another in its early 
stages was to go to the Supreme 
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Court to see whether it would 
take from the legislatures their 
power to determine and represent 
the social compact. I take it, 
however, that any so-called "pro-
lifer" had rather be out-voted 
than overruled and deprived of 
voice concerning the limits and 
the life-and-death terms of our 
social compact. This, not winning, 
is what is at stake in the profound 
alienation of millions and millions 
and millions of people brought 
about by the Court's decision in 
January 1973. I am very sorry 
that (as reported in the press) 
Justice Blackmun has received a 
good deal of "hate mail" since the 
decision he wrote for the Court. 
But I pray that he can fathom 
even in that the moral outrage 
over being deprived as a people 
of one of the most important as-
pects of our together being a peo-
ple over the course of time. Ev-
eryone knows along the pulses 
that for whom the bell tolls in 
these arbitrary -life-and-death de-
cisions, now surfaced to con-
sciousness and made "safe" by 
modern medicine, it could have 
tolled for him long ago and may 
yet toll for him at the end of life's 
span. 
With power restored to the peo-
ple to determine agreed criteria 
for including anyone in or ex-
cluding anyone from the human 
community, we still may go on 
our way toward some technologi-
cal version of the definitional so-
lution practiced by the Nuer tribe 
in Africa who treat infants born 
with grave deformities or suffer-
ing from genetic anomalies as ba-
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by hippopotamuses, accidentally 
born to humans and, with this 
labeling, the appropriate action is 
clear: they gently lay them in the 
river where they belong.! A shud-
der along the spine of every 
American is surely a fitting reac-
tion to the Court's account of 
why Western medicine has always 
been concerned to protect unborn 
lives. This is to be accounted for, 
we are told, because Christianity 
happened to take up the views of 
the Pythagoreans, a small sect in 
the Graeco-Roman world, with its 
Hippocratic oath pledging physi-
cians never to give abortificants. 
In now overcoming that limita-
tion, we are asked to recall that 
pagan outlooks in general and 
medicine in particular in pre-
Christian ages opposed neither 
abortion nor suicide. Passed over 
in silence is the fact that approval 
of abortion was associated with 
approval of infanticide. 
A Prophecy Fulfilled? 
In this there is retrospective 
prophecy well on the way toward 
fulfillment today! A doctor at 
Yale-New Haven Hospital, ex-
plaining on national television the 
newly announced policy of benign 
neglect of defective infants in that 
medical center, says that to have 
a life worth living a baby must 
be " lovable." Millard S. Everett 
in his book I deals of Life writes 
that "no child should be admitted 
into the society of the living" who 
suffers "any physical or mental 
defect that would prevent mar-
riage or would make others toler-
ate his company only from a 
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sense of mercy ... " Who is there 
among us who need not reply to 
that, "Mercy, me!"? Michael 
Tooley, Professor of philosophy at 
Stanford Univesrity, concludes 
that while it would be reprehensi-
ble to torture kittens, infants or 
other sentient creatures for an 
hour, it would not be wrong and 
no denial of rights to kill babies 
in the hospital nursery during the 
first two weeks after medically 
checking their acceptability, since 
human babies are no . more than 
kittens and cannot be bearers of 
rights until they have self-con-
sciousness of themselves as per-
sons. 3 A physician at the U niver-
sity of Virginia writes that he be-
lieves a woman's decision to allow 
a defective baby to die is "her 
second chance to have an abor-
tion." A fellow theologian , I re-
gret to say, always replies when 
I use the term " infanticide" : I 
prefer to call it "neo-naticide"! I 
myself am surprised by none of 
these views, nor for that matter 
do I consider them illogical ex-
tensions of what we are doing in 
the matter of abortion, nor are 
they without some backing. The 
legal and moral chaos they be-
speak stems rather from letting 
decisions about the criteria for 
acceptable life and rightful death 
decisions fall under the arbitra-
tion of private individuals. 
To say the least, the Court 
started these retrogressions into 
technological medical barbarism 
from which we shall not soon re-
cover, when it exercised no judi-
cial restraint, when it refused to 
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trust the people's moral sensibili-
ty and legislative deliberation to 
achieve rough agreement about 
who belongs with us in the com-
munity of equal rights bearers. 
That decision must somehow be 
reversed and life-and-death stand-
ard-setting must be de-privatized. 
In doing this, the Court itself 
rolled back by one stroke of the 
pen steadily increasing respect for 
the unborn child in the law itself 
- propelled onward and upward 
for decades by our increased 
knowledge of the humanity of 
unborn life in the modern period. 
That knowledge had all but 
opened a "new age of human 
childhood. " Yet the Court de-
clared that "the unborn have nev-
er been recognized in the law as 
persons in the whole sense." That, 
I believe, is demonstrably erron-
eous. Perhaps the Court meant to 
say that the whole law has never 
recognized the unborn as legal 
persons. That I think is true, e.g. 
"perfection" of standing and of 
the right to sue for pre-natal in-
jury only comes with birth. But 
"entitlement" to property con-
veyed to someone in utero is as to 
right perfect at that time; further 
"perfection" here can only mean 
collecting the cash to which right 
was fully established at the time 
of con veya 1. 
The Fitkin Case 
Then there is t he N. J . case 
Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Me-
morial Hospital u. Anderson, 201 
A2d 537, 42 N . J . 421 (1964), 
perhaps the crest of legal acknowl-
edgment of the unborn as full 
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legal persons in one part of our 
law. Here in t he case of a Jehovah ' 
Witness mother who refused a 
blood t ransfusion and who was 
pregnant, the court confronted 
the alternative of whether to 
bring this case under (1) the line 
of cases of adult Witnesses which 
generally respects their First 
Amendment right of religious lib-
erty and does not compel trans-
fusion even to save physical life, 
or under (2) the line of cases 
dealing with infants or minors of 
Jehovah Witnesses whose parents 
refuse to authorize blood trans-
fusions: here generally the courts 
have taken jurisdiction of the 
children and authorized the rec-
ommended or necessary medical 
treatment even against the re-
ligious conscience of the parents. 
Which sort of case was Fithin ? 
Both child and mother would die 
unless the state intervened. Chief 
Justice Weintraub wrote for a 
unanimous court": "We are satis-
fied that the unborn child is en-
titled to the law's protection and 
that an appropriate order should 
be made to insure blood trans-
fusions to the mother .... We 
have no difficulty in so deciding 
with respect to the infant child. 
. .. It is unnecssary to decide the 
question (of compelling the adult 
against her conscience ) because 
the welfare of the child and the 
mother are so intertwined and in-
sepa rable that it would be im-
practical to distinguish between 
them . . . " Notably in t his case 
the humanity and rights of the 
unborn child prevailed over the 
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First Amendment rights of the 
mother, which is a near-absolute 
in American law, when these were 
inseparably intertwined. There 
can scarcely be stronger evidence 
than that of recognition in our 
law of the unborn as a person in 
the whole sense, granting that this 
does not hold for the whole of our 
law. 
In this instance the issues in 
the case were decided after Mrs. 
Anderson had left the hospital. 
Following Wade, we can imagine 
another escape: she could request 
an elective abortion, thereby pre-
vent our law from successfully 
treating her child as a legally pro-
tectable person, and from her 
point of view deliver both him 
and herself intact of soul ("the 
blood is the life") until the day 
of the general resurrection! Such 
is by comparison the measure of 
the far more trivial reasons con-
scious persons may now use to 
disregard the rightful claims of 
the unborn, if indeed these exist 
any longer at all following Wade. 
The privatization of abortion de-
cisions means that no one need 
reach for a First Amendment 
right to consider overriding the 
right of the unborn to his or her 
life. No parity or balancing judg-
ment need now be made, not even 
one favoring the mother's con-
science. Instead, states are now 
expressly forbidden to bring the 
rights of the unborn as such into 
consideration. The minimum of 
regulations that are allowed indi-
rectly expressive of some inter-
est in "the potentiality of life" 
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must everyone be reasonably re-
lated directly only to the life and 
health of the mother. She is the 
one life to be treated as a person 
in the whole sense; or, I should 
say, even partially so in the face 
of the law. 
The fetus is not fully protecta-
ble (not fully a legal person), 
even after viability! Even after 
viability, the unborn child's right 
to life is not treated as needing 
to be in parity with the mother's 
life before being killed. Her health 
also may outweigh the child's 
life. The Court said hypothetical-
ly: "If the State is interested in 
protecting fetal life after viability, 
it may go so far as to proscribe 
abortion during that period ex-
cept when it is necessary to pre-
serve the life or health of the 
mother." I suppose most pro-
cedures directed toward trying to 
save a viable baby may have 
some adverse affect on the 
"health" of the mother, especial-
ly as that term is now too broadly 
interpreted by the medical pro-
fession. In an article generally 
favorable to permissive abortion 
and the Court's decision, Sissela 
Bok, lecturer in Medical Ethics 
at Radcliffe College (the Presi-
dent of Harvard is her consort) 
pleads: "Every effort must be 
made by physicians and others 
to construe the Supreme Court's 
statement (the foregoing state-
ment) to concern, in effect, only 
the life or threat to life of the 
mother."4 In a civilized society, 
why would Sissela Bok have so 
to plead? Why should the deci-
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sion to what extent a viable baby 
should be valued be privatized? 
Why should physicians be en-
dowed with such arbitrary power 
over young life that they need to 
be enjoined not to use it? In this, 
as well as in its reference to the 
unborn's capacity for "meaning-
ful" life outside the uterus, the 
Court steps across the line into 
"neo-naticide" of viable babies. 
The Ambiguity Remains 
Still the rightful claims of the 
unborn are manifest in the am-
biguity that remains. There are 
taxpayers' or other sorts of suits 
going forward in the courts ask-
ing that, following Wade, jurisdic-
tions that interpreted the Aid to 
Dependent Children Act to in-
clude pregnant welfare women be 
prohibited from doing so - on 
the ground, I suppose, that these 
women are not yet "with child" 
in the law's meaning. Other low-
er court decisions have held to the 
contrary that these women can-
not constitutionally be refused 
listing as welfare mothers. These 
latter cases raise the question: 
how can the state make payments 
in support of a person who does 
not exist? to her on account of 
no human being within? They 
raise the even more crucial moral 
question: if ADC payments are 
made to a woman for one or two 
months after her pregnancy is af-
firmed, and she then decides to 
elect an abortion under other laws 
that now treat her as the only 
person involved in that. issue, has 
she not to say the least frustrated 
the purpose of the ADC pay-
November, 1974 
ments to her? Surely there now 
is an intolerable contradiction be-
tween the legal personhood and 
the legal non-personhood ascribed 
to the unborn. 
Such are the perplexities that 
flow from violating ordinary lan-
guage in speaking of the unborn, 
especially in an era in which this 
usage has the backing of our mod-
ern knowledge of the independ-
ent, individual humanity of un-
born life. We do not ordinarily 
say a woman is "with embryo" or 
that she is "carrying a fetus." 
The attempt to say "fetus" rather 
than "child" is always an effort 
at first. We can become habituat-
ed to it, of course, just as we now 
customarily say "interrupt a preg-
nancy" when we mean abortion, 
although that expression was once 
t he way doctors spoke of Cae-
sarian sections to save an unborn 
life that could not he hrought to 
natural hirth! 
So too my own church has 
schooled itself to speak in its 
statement of Social Principles 
(adopted by General Conference 
in Atlanta, 1972) of "the sanctity 
of unborn human life," of "the 
sacredness of the life and well-
being of the mother (sic)" and in 
the same breath to call for the 
"removal of abortion from the 
criminal code, placing it instead 
under laws relating to other pro-
cedures of standard medical prac-
tice. " If there is unborn human 
life and if there indeed is a 
"mother," then abortion is not 
like any other "standard medical 
practice." Not until euthanasia 
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or "neo-naticide" becomes "stand-
ard." And life-and-death deci-
sions involving lives possessing 
sanctity have never before in the 
history of our civil community 
been believed to be a proper sub-
ject for purely privatized choices.' 
An Amendment As 
Possible Remedy 
I urge this Commitee and the 
U. S. Senate as a body to move an 
amendment to the Constitution 
that would return to the states 
their legislative power to protect 
the unborn child from privatized 
physician-patient decisions about 
its life or death. Such an amend-
ment would in no way bind in ad-
vance the decisions subsequently 
to be taken by the states. Lib-
eralization of abortion, perhaps 
its entire decriminalization would 
still be options open to the states. 
This would be a minimum reme-
dy, and the Senate may view it as 
optimal. The thrust of my testi-
mony, however, is to leave the 
content of an amendment up to 
the wisdom of the Senate; and for 
my own part simply to say that 
almost any remedy at this point 
in time would be better than no 
remedy at all. For the thrust of 
my testimony has been to the 
point of reversing the privatiza-
tion by the Court of decisions 
concerning protedable humanity, 
and toward the right of the peo-
ple to decide matters of such cru-
cial importance to our social com-
pact through ongoing public de-
bate and the political and leg-
islative processes of this nation. 
I am willing to have my own 
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views on abortion, and those who 
agree with them, kept within the 
public forum; and not enshrine 
them in the Constitution or in 
Court-made law - a restraint the 
pro-permissive abortion advocates 
were not willing to exercise. 
It may be that we have passed 
the point of no return to that 
remedy; and that this Committee 
and the U. S. Senate will judge 
it wiser to frame an amendment 
in some fashion substantively pro-
tecting the unborn from arbitrary 
choices. Here there may be an 
analogy with what followed in the 
wake of the Dred Scott decision. 
That decision took from the free 
states and territories the right 
and the power to recognize the 
humanity and protect rights of 
black people and ex-slaves. We all 
know the sequel: a tragic civil 
war, a more perfect union wrought 
out through carnage and sacri-
fice, the Fourteenth Amendment 
imposed on the former slave 
states. Perhaps that direct ap-
proach and substantive constitu-
tional protection of the rights and 
liberties of black ex-slaves was the 
better way - instead of trusting 
the far slower process of political 
and legislative deliberation in the 
free states and the gradual ero-
sion of slavery where it existed. 
Perhaps, then, some form of sub-
stantive constitutional protection 
of unborn human life is needed to 
overturn the "substantive due 
process" of a judicial decision that 
has the effect of turning every 
question both as to the wisdom 
and as to the morality of abortion 
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over to private decision-makers. 
One must at the least insist on 
the strong analogy between these 
two constitutional crises. This na-
tion is in a state of civil and moral . 
strife. Not because "pro-life" peo-
ple are generally speaking unwill-
ing to be outvoted; but because 
they now have no voice to cast 
about the extent of the human 
community in which we are to 
live. The right to life is 80 basic 
to our civil compact that one can 
imagine the divisions among us 
leading to open conflict, but for 
two differences: (1) Because of 
the more perfect union wrought 
by the Civil War there now exist 
no states claiming or actually ex-
ercising the sovereignty they once 
did: another loss of rights and 
powers formerly reserved to the 
states cannot now be resisted, 
and of course ought not to be. (2) 
In our present case no one has a 
"property" self-interest to assert 
or to deny in the case of the un-
born child as in the case of the 
slaves. (The claim that a woman 
has a right to do what she will 
"with her own body" comes close 
to a property-claim over the fetus; 
but perhaps that language ought 
not to be taken seriously.) For 
these reasons, our present con-
stitutional crisis is apt to expend 
itself in moral passion; and, un-
less there is remedy, further steps 
privatizing life-and-death deci-
sions and massive alienation from 
the body politic that has given 
over to private choices the deter-
mination of who belongs with us 
as a people each counting for one 
and no one for more than one. 
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There will be others testifying 
before you who will object to my 
placing confidence in the people 
through their representatives to 
judge who counts as a human life. 
This confidence may seem like 
the Court's touching faith in 
physicians to make independent 
medical decisions and not to per-
form abortions on request, or its 
privatizing of these decisions and 
regulating the wisdom and justice 
of such decisions only by licensure 
as if they are matters of standard 
medical practice and not also po-
litical or societal decisions about 
the boundary of the human com-
munity of an equal justice to all. 
My point is simply that physi-
cians are society's deputies in ap-
plying the criteria for stating that 
a new human being has put in his 
appearance or has passed from 
among us. My point thereafter is 
simply that decisions as to the 
criteria are necessarily human 
decisions, too; that such decisions 
as to the extent of our social com-
pact must rest with the people 
and our deliberative processes; 
that "the buck stops here" and 
cannot be appealed to anyone's 
private "revelation" nor ought it 
to be taken from us and then 
handed over to a pair of other 
human beings to decide or to any 
group less than the total body 
politic. 
Returning the Issue to the States 
Perhaps my confidence that re-
turning the abortion issue to the 
states may be a sufficient remedy 
rests back upon my belief that the 
factual evidence (that is all it can 
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be: a set of factual "good rea-
sons") for the individuated hu-
manity of the unborn child is now 
quite as clear as the evidence for 
the human countenance of any 
black, or of any Senator or of any-
one who testifies before you. Be-
fore we were so rudely interrupt-
ed on January 22, 1973, the 
weight of the evidence had opened 
a new era of human childhood, as 
I have said, and this weight was 
making its imprint on our law it-
self. The Court might have taken 
judicial notice of that evidence, 
instead of facing away from it. It 
is certainly the business of state 
legislatures and now of the Con-
gress to take notice of facts con-
cerning the unborn. There is rea-
son enough in our modem knowl-
edge for a Constitutional amend-
ment substantively protecting the 
unborn in some fashion and from 
some stage in their achievement 
of individuated humanity. 
That would be a maximal reme-
dy; my tentative proposal is a 
minimal one; Congress should say 
which is optimal and/ or feasible. 
Taken alone, Senator Mondale's 
"family impact" test would, I sus-
pect, have led us long ago in the 
direction of federal marriage and 
divorce legislation, as now maybe 
that test should lead us to see the 
need for some substantive deci-
sion-making at the constitutional 
level or at the federal legislative 
level on the matter of abortion. 
But our system is built upon the 
50 state jurisdictions; and, be-
cause of this, and in spite of some 
clear disadvantages that has, I 
278 
incline toward a constitutional so-
lution limited to returning to the 
states and the people within each 
of those jurisdictions the question 
of what we mean by the social 
compact of life with life. 
Professor Paul Freund, the dis-
tinguished authority on constitu-
tionallaw at Harvard University, 
has said that our system of divi-
sion of powers - executive, legis-
lative, and judicial - ultimately 
must rest upon the exercise of 
what he calls "constitutional mor-
ality." The staff of the House 
Judiciary Committee must have 
had "constitutional morality" in 
mind when in its memorandum on 
the meaning of an impeachable 
offense it said that a President 
has the duty "not to abuse his 
powers or transgress their limits 
- ... not to act in derogration of 
powers vested elsewhere by the 
Constitution;" and again in its 
reference to "adverse impact on 
the system of government."6 If 
that is correct, then impeachment 
of a President is a remedy for any 
derogration of powers vested else-
where by the Constitution; it is a 
way to insure "constitutional 
morality." 
The fact is, however, that im-
peachment is no remedy for an 
exercise of judicial power in dero-
gation of powers vested elsewhere 
or for decisions of the Court that 
have an adverse effect on our sys-
tem of government. It is no reme-
dy for decisions "beyond the call 
of Constitutional duty." That 
remedy is Constitutional amend-
ment; that is the way to insure 
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that "constitutional morality" 
shall continue constantly to be a 
restraint upon judicial activism. 
To our founding fathers in Con-
stitutional Convention, Professor 
Edward Corwin has pointed out 
in his book The President, Office 
and Powers, "the executive mag-
istracy was the natural enemy, 
the legislative assembly the nat-
ural friend of liberty." The mem-
bers of the Constitutional Con-
vention, of course, knew nothing 
of the judicial review that was 
later to become established. They 
could not have imagined that the 
judicial magistracy might become 
the natural enemy of liberty or of 
the legislative power in its direc-
tion of an ordered liberty. It 
would be ironical if the natural 
friend of liberty, our national leg-
islature, should now be aroused to 
institute impeachment procedures 
against an "imperial Presidency" 
for acts in derogation of powers 
vested elsewhere by the Constitu-
tion or for acts having adverse im-
pact on our system of govern-
ment, and if then the Congress 
does not bestir itself to use the 
remedy of Constitutional amend-
ment to correct a decision of an 
imperial Court that likewise has 
effects in derogration of powers 
vested elsewhere by the Constitu-
tion and adverse impact on the 
division between the judicial and 
the legislative power. 
It would be undefendable if im-
peachment may be used to chas-
ten the executive magistracy and 
not an amendment to chasten the 
judicial magistracy; if against the 
one hut not the other "Constitu-
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tional morality" can be sustained. 
In this regard, the extent to which 
a Supreme Court decision is pop-
ularly and automatically believed 
to be the last word on what the 
law is is also a measure of how 
legislative and amendatory au-
thority has slipped from "the 
legislative assembly." The Court, 
of course, in Bolton (issued, I 
suppose, one minute after Wade) 
ceremonially refers to Wade in 
the matter of what the law is. 
There can be no objection to that 
manner of speaking when the 
Court does it. But if the people, 
the state legislatures and the 
Congress join the chant, that is a 
certain sign that we wish to crown 
the judicial magistracy and legi-
timate its word as our final law. 
The amendatory procedure is 
more legitimate still ; and it is our 
chief recourse for insuring that 
what Freund called "Constitu-
tional morality" shall be a force 
in the interplay of the separate 
powers in our government. In any 
case, anyone who believes that 
there was need to submit to the 
states an "equal rights" amend-
ment, going beyond the Four-
teenth in guaranteeing equal 
rights for women, cannot with 
any consistency object to an 
amendment going beyond the 
Fourteenth, and correcting the 
Court's interpretation of it in 
Wade and Bolton, now being sub-
mitted to the states for possible 
adoption into our fundamental 
law. Object they surely will, with 
inconsistency and distrust of the 
people and of their right to amend 
in this instance. Unhesitatingly, 
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the call should go forth for the 
Congress to move an amendment 
that at the least restores to the 
states legislative power to decide 
whether and how human life-and-
death questions shall be dealt 
with in the criminal law and in 
regulation of the fateful actions 
of physicians. 
The opponents of a Life 
Amendment may finally be cor-
reeL The issue is the right of 
choice or decision. But that must 
be rightly understood. The issue 
is the right of a people through 
the legislative process to set the 
"credentials," the criteria, the 
signs of humanity to be used in 
making life-and-death decisions. 
Setting the outer limits of the 
human community should not be 
allowed to pass into the hands of 
private individuals, one, two, or 
many. 
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